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This paper examines to what extent incomplete compliance of environmental regulation mitigates 
the distortions caused by pre-existing labour taxes. We study the relative cost efficiency of three 
market-based instruments: emission taxes, tradable permits and output taxes. In a first-best setting 
and given that monitoring and enforcement is costless, we find that the same utility levels can be 
reached with and without incomplete compliance. However, allowing for violations makes the 
policy instruments less effective. The nominal tax rate needs to be higher or the number of permits 
issued smaller, in order to obtain the required emission reduction. Including monitoring and 
enforcement aspects, and more specifically fines, into the model in a second-best setting, provides 
us with a new means of collecting tax revenues and of lessening existing tax distortions. We show 
that the relative position of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes improves 
considerably when allowing for incomplete compliance in a second-best setting. 
Keywords: Environmental policy, instrument choice, monitoring and enforcement
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When designing environmental regulation the government has to decide, among other 
things, which policy instrument is best suited for the job. This choice is determined, in 
part, by the cost efficiency of the instrument, the political ease with which it can be 
implemented, its distributional impact and the technological feasibility. In this paper we 
focus on the efficiency costs associated with environmental policy instruments and, more 
specifically, how these costs are influenced by incomplete compliance if pre-existing 
distortionary taxes are present in the economy. 
Over the past decennia, it has become increasingly clear that firms do not always comply 
with existing regulation. Magat and Viscusi (1990), as an example, report an average level 
of non-compliance of 25 percent in the US pulp and paper industry between 1982 and 
1985. Limited governmental monitoring activities are partly to blame for this 
phenomenon, as noted by Russell et al. (1986) and Harrington (1988). Moreover, fines for 
detected violations are often quite low. For example, the median administrative fine 
imposed by the US EPA in 1995 was $4000, while the average fine was $10181 and the 
maximum fine was $125000 (Lear, 1998). In the US, less than 200 firms were fined in 
1995.  
This non-compliance by firms obviously makes environmental policies less effective. 
Therefore, the regulator should take monitoring and enforcement issues into consideration 
when selecting policy instruments. Sandmo (2002) has studied the impact of imperfect 
compliance on the ranking of policy instruments in a partial equilibrium context. We will 
focus on the general equilibrium context. Recent overviews of the monitoring and 
enforcement literature can be found in Cohen (2000), Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and 
Heyes (2001). The seminal paper of Becker in 1968 on the economics of crime was the 
start of rapid growth in both theoretical developments and empirical studies of monitoring 
and enforcement. 
In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the interaction between 
environmental policies and pre-existing tax distortions caused by, for example, labour 
taxes. It was shown that environmental policy instruments can increase distortions caused 
by existing taxes. In fact, reducing pollution, no matter how, has almost always a hidden 
cost when tax distortions exist (Goulder, 1995 and Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994).   3
Goulder et al. (1997) have used analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to 
explore the choice between pollution taxes and quotas in the presence of distortionary 
labour taxes. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) studied the choice between emission taxes 
and output taxes under costly monitoring. They show how the costs of monitoring 
emissions or output, influence the efficiency of both instruments. They find that “pure 
emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs and pure output taxes are 
optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs, sufficiently limited options for emission 
reduction by means other than output reduction, and sufficiently high substitutability of 
the output”. However, Schmutzler and Goulder do not allow for incomplete compliance 
by the firms.  
This paper extends the work of Goulder et al. (1999). In a second-best setting with pre-
existing labour taxes, they use a general equilibrium model to examine the costs of 
achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments. They 
compare the overall efficiency impact of emission taxes, emission quota, fuel taxes, 
performance standards and mandated technologies. The ability to generate revenues 
appears to have a significant influence on the cost efficiency of environmental policy 
instruments. They find that “prior taxes can eliminate the cost advantage of market-based 
instruments (emissions taxes and permits) over technology mandates or performance 
standards, particularly if the former policies fail to generate revenues and (fail to) use the 
revenues to finance cuts in the prior distortionary taxes”. This failure to generate 
revenues is the main drawback of emission quota compared to an emission tax. Output 
taxes have a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis emission taxes because they do not encourage 
firms to abate their emissions. Moreover, cost differences between instruments turn out to 
be highly sensitive to the extent of pollution abatement: for most policies, abatement costs 
converge to the same value only when the required emission reduction approaches 100 
percent. 
In a first-best setting, without distortionary taxation, and for a given actual reduction in 
emissions, the costs of the different instruments are the same with and without perfect 
compliance since we assume that monitoring and enforcement is costless. However, if the 
possibility of noncompliance by firms is incorporated, we find that a stricter policy is 
needed in order to reach a particular environmental goal. The policy instrument will be 
less effective and making the regulation more stringent compensates this.    4
Moreover, in a second-best setting, the ability to generate revenues and alleviate existing 
distortions appears to have a significant influence on the cost efficiency of environmental 
policy instruments. Including monitoring and enforcement aspects, and more specifically 
fines, into the model, provides us with a new means of collecting revenues for the 
government. We show that the relative position of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis 
emission taxes improves considerably when allowing for incomplete compliance in a 
second-best setting.  
Compared to Goulder et al. (1999) we limit the set of policy instruments. We only focus 
on market-based instruments: emission taxes, grandfathered tradable permits
2 and output 
taxes.  
In section 2 the model is specified, including monitoring and enforcement issues. In 
section 3 we derive and compare the gross efficiency costs of marginal policy changes in 
an analytical model. In section 4 we describe the numerical model, which is a general 
equilibrium model for the American economy and addresses the air pollutant NOx. This 
model is used to calculate the relative cost efficiency of different policy instruments for 
several levels of emission reductions in section 5. In section 6 we conclude.  
 
2. THE MODEL 
As indicated in the introduction, the model originates from the work of Goulder et al. 
(1999). We particularly focus on the monitoring and enforcement aspects associated with 
the firms’ compliance decisions. Subsequently, we discuss the behaviour of households, 
firms and government. 
 
                                                           
2 Grandfathered tradable permits are distributed freely among firms; rather than auctioning or selling the 
tradable permits to firms. The grandfathered, or free, permits are often distributed according to historical 
emission levels. After the initial distribution, permits can be traded amongst firms and a market price for 
permits will occur.    5
2.1 Households 
In this static, general equilibrium model a representative household derives utility from the 
consumption of a polluting good D, a clean good N and from leisure. Leisure is equal to 
the household’s time endowment T less labour supply L. Consumer utility is affected 
negatively by the environmental damage caused by the emissions E resulting from the 
production of the polluting good. The household’s utility function is: 
  ( ) ( ) ,, Uu D N TL E φ =− −  (1) 
where u(.) is a quasi-concave utility function for non-environmental goods. The function 
(.) φ  represents the disutility from emissions and is weakly convex. The separability 
restriction in equation (1) implies that demand for D and N and supply of labour do not 
vary with changes in E.
3 Moreover, we only consider efficiency aspects and ignore 
distributional concerns. 
The household’s budget constraint is: 
  (1 ) DL pD N t L G + =− ++ Π       (2) 
where  D p  is the demand price of D. This price is equal to unity in the absence of 
regulation. The price of the non-polluting good  N p  is constant, equal to unity and not 
affected by the environmental policy. The non-polluting good N is the numeraire in the 
theoretical model. The firms’ profits ∏ are redistributed to the households. The 
households also receive a lump-sum transfer G from the government. 
                                                           
3 Relaxing this assumption would complicate the tax-interaction effect discussed below. If, compared with 
consumption, leisure is a relatively strong (weak) substitute for environmental quality, then this effect is 
weakened (strengthened). There is little empirical evidence on the relative ease of substitution between 
leisure, overall consumption, and environmental quality. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to 
assume separability, which implies that changes in environmental quality do not affect the relative 
attractiveness of consumption and leisure. (Goulder et al., 1999)  
For a model without this separability assumption see Mayeres and Proost (1997). In their model the demand 
for production goods and the supply of labour depend on the changes in environmental quality and feedback 
effects occur. Mayeres and Proost look at a congestion type of externality and derive optimal tax and public 
investment rules.   6
The households choose D, N and L in order to maximise their utility subject to the budget 
constraint, taking environmental damages as given. From the resulting first-order 
conditions the uncompensated demand and labour supply functions are obtained: 
  ( , 1, ) ,( , 1, ) a n d( , 1, ) DL DL DL D p tG N p tG L p tG −+ Π −+ Π −+ Π  (3) 
Substituting these equations into (1) gives the indirect utility function: 
  (, 1 , ) ( ) DL Vv p t G E φ =− + Π −  (4) 
 
2.2 Firms 
The competitive firms maximise profits and are risk neutral. Household labour, which is 
the only factor of production, is used to produce goods D and N. The marginal product of 
labour is assumed to be constant in each industry. Output is normalised such that the 
marginal products and the wage rate equal unity. Firms decide on the production of D and 
N, on abatement expenditures and on the amount of taxes paid (or permits bought). Due to 
non-compliance by firms, the reported emissions on which taxes are paid (or emissions 
covered by permits) do not equal the total actual emissions in the economy. Economy-
wide emissions E equal 
( ) o Eea D e D =− = 
with e total emissions per unit of D, which equal the difference between the baseline 
emissions eo per unit of output and the reduction a in per-unit emissions due to abatement. 
Firms can reduce their emissions per unit of output by using abatement equipment that is 
produced directly from labour. The total cost C of abatement is: 
C = c(a).D  (5) 
where c(a) is a convex function representing the per-unit cost of abatement activity. 
Thus, total emissions fall as a result of reduced production of the polluting good D (the 
output-substitution effect) and increased abatement activity (the abatement effect). In the 
numerical model we will incorporate a third way of emission reduction, namely via input-  7
substitution. This means that firms will have the option to change their input mix and use 
less of the most polluting input.  
We now concentrate on the implications of noncompliant behaviour by firms. We assume 
that firms can be noncompliant in a continuous way. The regulator anticipates the firms’ 
inclination to cheat and will therefore pursue a monitoring and enforcement policy in 
order to deter them. We consider three different instruments: an emission tax, tradable 
permits and an output tax. 
 
2.2.1 Emission tax 
Considering an emission tax  E t , firms have to choose the fraction  E θ  of their emissions 
they wish to report to the government. It is obvious that reported emissions never exceed 
actual emissions if firms behave rationally (01 E θ ≤ ≤ ).  
Every firm is inspected with a fixed probability  E p  regardless of its compliance status. 
The environmental inspection agency audits a certain percentage of all firms at random. A 
noncompliant firm, however, faces an additional probability of inspection proportional to 
the size of its violation. This variable inspection probability equals  [ ] 1 EE η θ − . It reflects 
the regulatory practice of following up complaints. These complaints can be issued by 
neighbours, interest groups or civil servants. We assume that these complaints are 
positively correlated to the seriousness of the infraction. The total probability of detection 














−   =+   
=+ −
     (6) 
We assume that performing inspections
4 and levying fines are costless. Moreover, 
measurement and judicial errors are absent in our model. Consequently, all violators are 
caught if they are inspected. 
                                                           
4 We normalise the inspection costs to zero because we do not have reliable estimates of their levels. Later 
we will perform a sensitivity analysis and perform the empirical exercise with strictly positive inspection 
costs.    8
Once the violator is caught, the firm has to pay a penalty rate π on the evaded taxes. This 
rate is assumed to exceed one since firms will have to pay at least the tax rate on 
unreported emissions. The total payment is called the fine FE (= fE D) and is equal to  
[ ] 1 EE E E E FE E t with θ ππ =− ≥  
 
2.2.2 Tradable permits 
In a system of grandfathered tradable permits
5, the government determines an overall 
acceptable level of emissions and issues permits
6 correspondingly. These permits are 
distributed freely among firms proportional to their baseline emissions. The government, 
therefore, does not receive any revenues from issuing the permits.  
Firms can obtain more permits by trading. However, since all firms are homogeneous, no 
trade will occur. This policy can be interpreted as a virtual tax 
v
E t  on emissions, where the 
‘revenues’ are rebated in a lump-sum fashion
7. These revenues represent the rents 
associated with grandfathered permits. The limited supply of emission permits imply a 
reduced output, which gives rise to economic rents.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
However, there can be reasons for non-compliance even if monitoring is costless. If the inspection agency is 
ineffective due to measurement errors (see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) or uncertainty about the legal rules 
(Craswell and Calfee, 1986), firms can choose to be non-compliant. Including these possibilities into our 
model would lead us to differentiate between the probability of inspection, the probability of detection and 
the probability of punishment. We choose not to make this distinction in order to keep the computations 
tractable.  
5 Instead of distributing the permits freely, or grandfathering, the government could also decide to auction 
the permits. Such an auction would generate revenues for the government. In our model, without transaction 
costs, auctioned tradable permits are equivalent to an emission tax. We, therefore, decide to model only 
grandfathered tradable permits. 
6 We assumed that one permit allows a firm to produce one unit of emissions. 
7 We model the permits as an emission tax with lump-sum redistribution of the tax revenues (but not the fine 
revenues). The only difference between permits and the emission tax is that government revenues from 
emission taxes are absent for permits.   9
Initially firms will claim that the emissions produced E equal the number  pE θ  of permits 
they own ( 01 p with θ ≤ ≤ ). However, this is not necessarily true. With a certain 
probability of detection, depending on a fixed inspection frequency and the seriousness of 
the violation, firms are caught lying. This is: 
det, 1
p










  =−   

 




pp E p p F EE t w i t h θ ππ =−  ≥   
We assume that the monitoring and enforcement parameters are equal across the different 
policy instruments. Consequently, we will drop the indices and use  ,a n d p η π  from now 
on. 
 
2.2.3 Output tax 
The government can also decide to tax the polluting good D directly at a tax rate tD. Under 
this regulatory scheme, firms will never abate their emissions. The output tax is, after all, 
levied on the amount of output D and this is independent of the abatement expenditures by 
firms. Firms will initially pay taxes on reported output  DD θ  with 0 1 D θ ≤≤ . With a 









−  =+ =+ − 
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Detected violators have to pay the overdue taxes increased with penalty payments or 
() 1 DD D FDD t w i t h θπ π =− ≥ . 
   10
2.3 Government 
The government levies a proportional tax of  L t on labour earnings, regulates emissions and 
provides a fixed nominal lump-sum transfer G to the households. The government budget 
is assumed to be balanced. Adjusting the labour tax
8  L t  offsets any revenue consequences 
from environmental policies. In the numerical model we will assume that rent or capital 
income is taxed at the same rate as labour income. 
The expression for the government budget is: 
  det, EE DD L mm E LF G tt D t p θ θ = ++ +  (7) 
with  { } ,, mE p D ∈  depending on the policy instrument used by the government. We 
assume that the government uses only one instrument at a time. 
We assume that there are no costs attached to performing inspections and levying fines. 
We return to this assumption later. Remark also that the government, under a 
grandfathered permit system, does not receive any income from the environmental policy 
except for the fine payments. 
 
3. GROSS EFFICIENCY COST OF THE DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
In this analysis we focus on the gross efficiency cost of different environmental policies. 
This cost is the monetary equivalent of the loss in utility. It is a gross concept in that it 
does not include the change in environmental damages. Next we analyse the gross 
efficiency cost of three environmental policies with imperfect compliance and obtain the 
results of Goulder et al. (1999) as a special case. 
 
                                                           
8 In a one-consumer setting, the optimal tax structure is to use only the lump-sum tax G and to have  L t = 0 or 
to use a profit tax in the presence of pure profit. In this case the Goulder et al. problem becomes trivial 
because we can return to a first-best if Pigouvian taxes can be used (Mayeres and Proost (1997)). However, 
this simple framework will allow us to better isolate the effects of the environmental policy.   11
3.1 The gross efficiency cost of emission taxes 
Firstly, we discuss the impact of emission taxes on the firms. We concentrate on the 
changes in actual emissions and in the fraction of emissions reported. Secondly, we derive 
the gross efficiency costs of emission taxes, tradable permits and output taxes. 
 
3.1.1 The impact of the emission tax on the firms 
Let us consider a revenue-neutral tax  E t on emissions. The firm’s profit per unit of D is:  
  ( ) { } det, 1 DE E E E pc a t e p f θ −+ + +  (8) 
with  [ ] [ ] det, 1 EE E E E p fp ee t θ η θπ −  =+ −   
θE e   = reported emissions per unit of output 
π   = penalty payments on overdue taxes 
  p   = fixed inspection frequency 
  η  = variable inspection parameter 
and, since we work in competitive markets, profits are zero in equilibrium. 
We consider the case in which both the emission tax and the penalty are positive and 
finite. The other scenarios are discussed in appendix A. The firms will never report zero 
emissions because then the firm would always have to pay the complete tax plus the 
penalty. It could always do better by reporting truthfully because then it would not have to 
pay the fine. However, there exists an internal solution that is even better, which we will 
derive now. 
The firm’s problem can be defined as choosing actual emissions e  and fraction of 
emissions reported θE to minimise unit costs of environmental compliance. This can be   12
broken into two stages: firstly, the optimal choice of θE for any given e and secondly, the 
optimal choice of actual emissions e for given optimal θE.
9 
First, for given e, the firm chooses θE to minimise the proportion of tax it actually pays:  
  [ ] [ ] { } (,,) m i n 1 1
E
EE E pp
θ ρπ η θ π θ η θ   ≡+ − + −      (9) 

























































. Rationality dictates that 
* 1 E θ ≤ ; or firms never report more 
than their actual emissions. This implies that the condition 1 pπ ≤  must hold
10.  
The resulting proportion of the tax actually paid is:  











=−  (11) 
























 and the 
                                                           
9 We implicitly assume that the firm first decides on the number of emission and only afterwards on the 
amount of reported emissions. We solve this problem by backward induction.  
10 If this condition does not hold and  1 pπ > , there is overdeterrence and the expected fine of dishonest 
reporting is larger than the cost of paying all due taxes. All firms, therefore, report their taxes honestly. This 
same result, truthful reporting, could also have been obtained, and at lesser cost, by setting  1 pπ = .   13














.  These signs hold since rationality 
implies  1 pπ ≤ . 
We can now define the effective tax rate as a fraction of the nominal tax rate, 
()
* ,, EE p t τρ π η = . 
Next, in a second step, the firm chooses the actual emissions e to minimise its 
environmental costs: 
  ( ) ()m i n Eo E e ce e e γτ τ ≡− +      (12) 
This gives us the following expression: 
  ( )
** ' oE E ce e t τ ρ −==  (13) 
For each firm, abatement activity occurs until the marginal abatement cost per unit of D 
equals the effective emission tax rate. If we want to find out how the optimal firm 









=−  and 
therefore,  ()
* ' E e γτ = . 
The profit per unit of output is equal to  ( ) { }
** 1 Do E p ce e e τ −+ −+  and perfect 
competition then ensures that  ( ) 1 D E p γ τ =+ . 
 
3.1.2 Derivation of the gross efficiency costs 
We now consider an incremental, revenue-neutral increase in the nominal emission tax 
rate  E t , starting from a strictly positive tax rate. The effect of this policy reform on the 








ρ πη =  (14) 
Revenues from the emission tax will be employed to finance cuts in the distortionary 
labour tax  L t .  
Using the requirement of balancing the governmental budget and deriving the efficiency 
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  
 ∂
++ −  ∂ 
 (15) 



















≡  (16) 
This is the (partial equilibrium) efficiency cost from raising an additional dollar of labour 
tax revenue. The numerator is the efficiency loss from an incremental increase in  L t . This 
equals the wedge between the gross wage (equal to the value of the marginal product of 
labour) and the net wage (equal to the marginal social cost of labour in terms of foregone 
leisure), multiplied by the reduction in labour supply. The denominator is the marginal 
labour tax revenue (from differentiating  L t L). 
We find, using  [ ] 0 E ea D =− , that: 





=− + −  (17) 
Substituting (17) in (15), using (14), gives us:   15
** * 1
(,,) (,,) (,,) EE E
EE E E
abatement output substitution revenue recycling
dv da dD dE
pt D pt e M p E t
dt dt dt dt
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As in Goulder et al. (1999) we find that the gross cost of an increase in the emission tax, 
recycled via a decrease in labour taxes, can be decomposed into four effects. The 
reduction in emissions is achieved via a combination of two effects: the reduction of 
emissions per unit of output (abatement effect) and the substitution away from the 
consumption of D (output-substitution effect). These two effects are called the primary 
costs. In a first-best setting, the relative cost-effectiveness of different policies can be 
explained fully in terms of differences in primary costs.  
In a second-best setting, with distortionary taxes, two additional cost terms come into 
play. The first term is the efficiency gain from the (marginal) revenue-recycling effect. 
This is the product of the marginal excess burden of taxation and the marginal revenues (if 
any) from the policy. It represents efficiency gains associated with using these revenues to 
finance cuts in distortionary taxes.  
The second extra term is the efficiency loss from the tax interaction effect. This effect has 
two components. First, the new policy can increase the price of D, implying an increase in 
the cost of consumption and thus a reduction in the real wage. This reduces labour supply 
and produces a marginal efficiency loss that equals the tax wedge between the gross and 
the net wage multiplied by the reduction in labour supply. In addition, the reduction in 
labour supply contributes to a reduction in tax revenues, which has an efficiency cost of M 
times the lost tax revenues, equal to the change in labour supply times the labour tax rate.  
Incorporating incomplete compliance in the model means that the effective tax rate  E τ  
equals the nominal tax rate  E t  times the factor 
*(,,) 1 p ρπ η≤ . The effective tax rate is, 
therefore, lower than the nominal one. Some firms can get away with only paying taxes on 
their reported emissions and not on their actual emissions. Since the effective tax rate is 
lower, all the different efficiency effects will also be lower. The four effects are deflated   16
with the same factor 
*(,,) p ρ πη . Therefore, we can say that the gross efficiency cost of a 
marginal increase in the nominal emission tax is lower in the model with monitoring and 
enforcement. However, this does not mean that utility is higher for the model with partial 
compliance. Remember that we did not take the environmental effects of the policy into 
account.
11 For a given level of the emission tax, it is obvious that the environmental 
quality is worse in the partial compliance case. In order to reach the same environmental 
emission reduction as with full compliance, one needs to set a comparatively higher tax 
rate. 
When π approaches infinity
12, there is full compliance and the factor 
*(,,) p ρ πη  equals 
one. The results of Goulder et al. are a special case of our results. Note that, for a given 
actual reduction in emissions, the costs of the emission tax in this paper and in Goulder et 
al. (1999) are equivalent, except for the resource costs involved in inspection and 
monitoring. 
 
3.2 The gross efficiency cost of tradable permits 
Remember that a grandfathered tradable permit system can be interpreted as a virtual tax 
v
E t  on emissions, where the ‘revenues’ are rebated in a lump-sum fashion. We analyse the 
gross cost of a decrease in the number of permits that is distributed via an increase in the 
virtual tax 
v
E t .  
The profit for the firm per unit of D is: 
                                                           
11 In order to include environmental effects, we would need to value them. Determining the consumers’ 
willigness-to-pay for environmental improvement is a difficult and complicated exercise; see, for example, 
Mitchell and Carson (1989). The valuation of the environmental quality will influence the benefits 
associated with an environmental policy. Moreover, it is often difficult to assess the impact of increases in 
emissions on overall environmental quality since this relationship is influenced by, for example, the timing 
of the emissions and the characteristics of the receiving environmental medium. 
12 In reality we do not observe infinitely high fines since the wealth of individuals and firms is limited. For 
an analysis of fines when wealth varies among individuals see Polinsky and Shavell, 1991.   17
  () { } 11
vv
DE p p p E p ca t e p e et θη θθ π     −+ + ++ − −      (19) 
















































The effect of an incremental increase in the virtual tax can be derived in a similar manner 
as for the emission tax. This gives: 
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Compared to the emission tax case, we have the same abatement, output-substitution and 
tax-interaction effect. The revenue-recycling effect, however, will be smaller. The 
existence of a revenue-recycling effect contrasts with Goulder et al.’s (1999) results. They 
found no such effect for tradable permits because of the full compliance assumption. 
Under incomplete compliance, the collected fines generate revenues for the government. 
That is why we observe a revenue-recycling effect. This effect reduces the disadvantage of 
grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes in a second-best world. Another 
interpretation of this result is the observation that the fine has some characteristics of a 
(non-linear) tax, albeit one that is imposed only with a certain probability (Sandmo, 2002). 
   18
3.3 The gross efficiency cost of an output tax 
We now consider the output tax  D t on the polluting output D. Firms have no incentive to 
invest in abatement technologies under this regulatory policy. Only the quantity produced 
of good D has an effect on the taxes paid. 
The profit for the firm per unit of D is: 
  () [ ] [ ] { } 11 DD DD D D p ca t e p e et θ ηθ θ π  −+ + ++− −   (23) 
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(26) 
The abatement effect is absent. The output tax does not induce firms to abate their 
emissions. However, emissions of the hazardous pollutant decrease by the reduction of the 
output of good D. In a setting of incomplete compliance, this output-substitution effect is 
smaller than under complete compliance. The same holds for the revenue-recycling and 
tax interaction effects. Both are multiplied by the same factor  ( )
* ,, p ρ πη . 
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4. NUMERICAL MODEL 
Next we illustrate the results of the theoretical analysis with an empirical exercise. The 
main objective of this exercise is not to model the American economy as realistically as 
possible. We want to highlight the impact of incomplete compliance on the relative cost 
efficiency of market-based instruments. Therefore, we chose to use the same model and 
data as Goulder et al. (1999), who treated the perfect compliance case. This facilitates the 
comparison and interpretation of the results.  
Subsequently, we describe the model. Some additional assumptions with respect to the 
theoretical model are made.  
 
4.1 Description of the model 
We use a general equilibrium model for the American economy, calibrated to the 1990 
situation. The environmental pollution problem addressed is the air pollutant NOX.  
Deviating from the theoretical model, we incorporate intermediate inputs in the production 
model. This yields a new channel for emission reduction: the input-substitution effect. 
Emissions can be reduced not only by abatement and output substitution but also by input 
substitution. This means that the firms can alter the mix of intermediate inputs and use less 
of the polluting input.  
We distinguish two different intermediate goods: a polluting (D) and a clean (N) 
intermediate good. In our application the polluting good can be thought of as being 
energy. There are two final consumption goods: CD represents output from industries that 
use  D more intensively and CN represents output from industries that use N more 
intensively. The production relationships between different commodities are: 
-  Final goods CD and CN are produced using goods D and N 
-  Intermediate goods D and N are produced using labour L and goods D and N.  
The structure of the numerical model is directly based on the previously discussed 
theoretical model. Labour is the numeraire.    20
We assume that the representative household has a nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES
13) utility function (the definitions of the variables and parameters can be 
















where leis depicts leisure, the σ’s represent different elasticities of substitution, the α’s are 
distribution parameters and C is composite consumption. 
The household maximises utility with respect to the budget and time constraint: 
   [ ] [ ] 11 CD CN L L tot R C p CD p CN p t L t p G += − + Π − +  (28) 
  totaltimeendowment T L leis == +  (29) 
with  [ ] 1 tot R t Π−  the total after-tax rent or capital income. The tax rate on rent income tR 
equals the labour tax tL. 
We now consider the production side of the economy. A CES-form is used for the 
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   
∑  (30) 
We assume a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Labour and rent income are 
taxed at the same rate () L R tt =
14. We work with linear marginal abatement costs.  
Firms choose profit-maximising production Xj and abatement Aj subject to the constraints 
imposed by environmental regulation and taking input prices pri and output prices pj as 
                                                           
13 Further reading on CES functions can be found in Keller (1976). 
14 In the numerical exercise both tax rates are reduced if we have extra revenue from the environmental 
policy. It would also be possible to adapt only the labour tax rate. This would not change the results for the 
instruments with zero profit for the firms. For the other instruments we expect some small changes.    21
given. Profits equal the value of output minus expenditures on inputs, labour and 
abatement, less any tax and fine payments. This gives the following expression: 
  det jj j X j j i i j E E j j j j j
i
p tX p r X t E A p F θθ  Π= − − − − −  ∑  (31) 
The resulting emissions per industry are: 
1
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 =−  
     
 (32) 
with  D β  representing the pollution content of good D and parameters  and e α χ  describing 
the emission abatement technology
15. 
To obtain a general equilibrium, supply must equal demand for all produced goods, 
government revenue must equal government transfer payment, and pollution emissions 
must equal a specified target. Since production and abatement functions are linearly 
homogeneous, the supply of each good is perfectly elastic at given factor prices and tax 
rates. Under these conditions we can reduce the set of equilibrium conditions to three 
equations:  
aggregate labour demand equals aggregate supply
16: Lj j
j j
LA X =+ ∑ ∑ ,  
government revenue equals expenditures: 
  det LL R j j Xj j E E j j j j C
jj j j
REV p t L t p G tX tE p F θθ ≡+ = Π+ + + ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
and pollution levels equal the target level: [ ] 1 j
j
E reduc Etot =− ∑
17.   
 
                                                           
15 In the numerical exercise we choose  0.5 χ = , which implies linear marginal abatement costs. 
16 We assume that one unit of labour is needed to produce one unit of abatement. 
17 In the GAMS model we only use the government budget and emission target conditions. By Walras’ law, 
if these two conditions are satisfied, the third condition must also hold. We have used this third condition, 
labour market clearance, as a check on the optimality of the obtained solution.   22
4.2 Data 
In Table 1 we summarise the benchmark data set of Goulder et al. (1999), which 
represents the United States’ economy in 1990. Production data were obtained from the 
Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
The polluting intermediate good D covers fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas), while the 
clean good N includes all other intermediates. The final good CD is a composite of the 
consumer goods whose production involves intensive use of fossil fuels (consumer 
utilities, motor vehicles and gasoline), while the good CN embraces all other final goods.  
 





D  91 441  111 843 156 881 6 264   366 429
N  88 073  4 741 098 464 160 2 670 486   7 963 817
Labour  186 915  3 110 876 1 832 106  5 129 897
Total output value  366 429  7 963 617 621 041 2 676 750  
Emissions (millions 
of Kilograms) 
23 000   
Table 1: Input-output flows (in millions of 1990 dollars per year except when otherwise noted)  
Source: Goulder et al. (1999) 
The parameter values used in the model can be found in appendix C. The distribution 
parameters α for production and utility functions were calibrated in GAMS based on the 
assumed elasticities of substitution and the restriction that the benchmark data must be 
replicated in the absence of a new environmental policy. 
Although we try to derive general relationships, we must commit to certain parameter 
values in running the model. The central case values for pollution-related parameters are 
identical to Goulder et al. (1999). Pollution takes place every time a unit of D is used in 
the production process.   23
We also had to determine the monitoring and enforcement strategy. Accurate and realistic 
data are very difficult to obtain. From Belgian data we know that, yearly, ten percent of all 
firms are inspected ( 0.1 p = ), and we assume that the variable inspection parameter η 
equals 0.5. Furthermore, court experience tells us that violators have to pay twice the 
amount of evaded taxes (π = 2) in Belgium. This will be our reference point. Moreover, in 
this model monitoring and enforcement are costless. In section 6 we discuss the 
implication of these assumptions and perform a sensitivity analysis. 
 
5. COMPARING THE GROSS COST OF DIFFERENT POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
We now determine the impact of different policies that all produce the same net emission 
reduction. Using initial prices we define the welfare gain as that sum of money which the 
households would have accepted in the initial position as equivalent to the impact of the 
reform, and we call this the equivalent gain, or equivalent loss, (King – 1983). It is defined 
by
18:   ( ) ( ) ,,
RN RR EG equivalent gain EF p U EF p U == −     (33) 
with EF being the expenditure function. In the reference situation we assume that there are 
no emission reductions and no environmental policy. The elements of the reference price 
vector p
R are all assumed to be equal to unity. Therefore, we can rewrite the equivalent 







20:    
 
NR EG U U =− . (34) 
In each new scenario we impose a certain level of emission reduction, e.g. 10 percent. For 
every policy instrument we then determine the optimal size so that the required emission 
reduction is achieved. With each scenario a new utility level is associated. It is obvious 
that after the introduction of the environmental regulation utility will be lower. This holds 
                                                           
18 with EF(.) = expenditure function,  R = the reference value and N = the new value 
19 with pu the price of utility or 11 pU p t L t p G u tot LL RC =−+ Π − +     . 
20 This holds for the specific functional forms  we use in our model, where the marginal utility of income 
equals  u p , but this is not a general result.   24
because we ignore any utility effect of improved environmental quality (i.e. leaving out 
the benefit of the policy, which gives us the gross cost, rather than the net welfare change).  
First we compute the efficiency losses in a first-best setting and only later we look at the 
second best setting. This allows us to distinguish between the impact of including 
distortionary taxes and the impact of incomplete compliance. To facilitate comparisons 
across instruments we take the emission tax as a reference point. We will compare the 
equivalent loss of all instruments with that of the emission tax in each scenario. 
 
5.1 First-best setting: gross costs with and without perfect compliance 
We first consider the equivalent gain in a first-best setting
21 (L t =0) with perfect 
compliance. This exercise mimics the one performed by Goulder et al. (1999). Only 
primary costs will apply. The losses (or costs) under the different policy instruments are 
shown in figure 1. The differences across policies are expressed as the ratio of total losses 
of the policy in question to total costs under the emission tax. Consequently, the curve for 























Emission tax Output tax Tradable permits  
Figure 1: The cost ratio of first-best policy alternatives with perfect compliance to the cost 
of a first-best emission tax with perfect compliance 
 
                                                           
21 Any government revenues are returned in a lump-sum fashion to the households.   25
The curve for the tradable permits is equal to unity and therefore coincides with the curve 
for the emission tax. This means that, in a first-best setting, grandfathered tradable permits 
are just as efficient as emission taxes. This holds because the tax interaction and revenue-
recycling effects do not prevail in the absence of distortionary taxes and thus the source of 
the cost differences, the revenue-recycling effect, is absent.  
Next we consider the output tax. Its first-best cost exceeds that of the emission tax because 
the abatement effect is absent. Firms will not reduce emissions by installing abatement 
equipment because it does not help them to comply with the policy and it is costly. 
We now compare these results with the results obtained in a model with imperfect 
compliance and investigate how monitoring and enforcement aspects influence the relative 
cost efficiency of the instruments. Since monitoring and enforcement are costless, the 
industries are perfectly competitive and the reductions in emissions are equal, we obtain 
exactly the same utility levels in the simulation with and without perfect compliance. 
Including monitoring and enforcement costs would alter the results. The costs of the 
environmental regulation would then be higher under incomplete compliance than under 
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Figure 2: Comparing emission tax rates under perfect and imperfect compliance 
Even though the utility levels are equal, the tax rates necessary to obtain the required 
emission reduction differ for the two scenarios (see figure 2). The tax rate under perfect   26
compliance is 84 percent of the rate under imperfect compliance. Given the values chosen 
for the monitoring and enforcement parameters, this 84 percent is the proportion of tax 
actually paid or  ( )
* ,, p ρ π η . From the theoretical analysis we recall (equation (12)):
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The effective tax rate under imperfect compliance is a fraction 
* ρ  of the nominal tax rate. 
As expected, the firms’ noncompliance forces the government to set a higher tax rate in 
order to obtain the desired environmental result.  
Analogously, we find that, in order to obtain a particular environmental quality goal, the 
regulator has to issue fewer permits under incomplete compliance than under full 
compliance. Moreover, under incomplete compliance, the nominal output tax will also be 
1.19 (1/0.84) times the nominal tax under full compliance.  
Looking at expression (11), we compute the proportion of emissions reported: 
()
* 1












Given the monitoring and enforcement policy, firms will report 60 percent of their 
emissions. Analogously, under an output tax, firms will report 60 percent of their output 
(see expression (24)). Under a tradable permit scheme, firms will only cover 60 percent of 
their emissions with permits (see equation (20)).  
Allowing firms to partially comply with environmental regulation, leads to stricter 
policies. In order to obtain a certain environmental goal, the government has to take into 
account that some firms will decide to violate the regulation.  
 
5.2. Second-best setting 
In a second-best setting we take the effect of pre-existing distortionary labour taxes ( L t = 
0.4) into account and use the policy revenues for decreasing this distortionary tax. The 
resulting cost ratios under full compliance are represented in figure 3. We compare the   27
results with the first best emission tax. Again we have results for three policy instruments: 


























Figure 3: The cost ratio of second-best policy alternatives with perfect compliance to the 
cost of the first-best emission tax with perfect compliance.  
We find that, under second best, the efficiency costs of an emission tax are ten percent 
higher than first best. The tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects contribute to a 10 
percent increase in the costs of an emission tax. The tradable permit system performs 
considerably worse due to the lack of a revenue-recycling effect. This policy does not 
generate revenues for the government that can be used to alleviate existing distortions. 
Finally the relative position of the output tax does not change vis-à-vis the emission tax. 
These results duplicate the ones of Goulder et al. (1999). 
We now investigate how these results change when we allow firms to violate the 
environmental policy. The cost curves for imperfect compliance in a second-best world 
are shown in figure 4. They are all expressed relative to the cost of emission taxes in a 
first-best world. In general, we find that the compliance rate equals 60 percent for the 
three instruments. This is identical to the results in a first-best setting since the same   28
monitoring and enforcement parameters are chosen. Moreover, we find that allowing firms 
to violate environmental regulation increases welfare slightly (given the assumption of 
costless monitoring and enforcement). The firms have more flexibility in their decision-


























Figure 4: The cost ratio of second-best policy alternatives with imperfect compliance to 
the cost of first-best emission tax with perfect compliance. 
We also notice two important effects on the relative cost efficiency of the environmental 
policy instruments. First, when we examine the cost of using emission taxes, the cost 
increase due to the labour market distortion is approximately the same (10%). Secondly, 
the relative cost difference of grandfathered tradable permits compared to emission taxes 
has decreased spectacularly. It even disappears completely when the required emission 
reduction approaches 100 percent. The reason for this result is the revenue- recycling 
effect that now exists for tradable permits too: revenues are generated through fines and 
these can be used to alleviate the distorting labour tax. Clearly, fines have some 
characteristics in common with taxes (Sandmo, 2002). Imperfect compliance does not 
affect the relative disadvantage of output taxes compared to emission taxes. 
We now look at the results for grandfathered tradable permits in more detail. Firstly, an 
important consequence of allowing imperfect compliance is the effect on the distortionary   29
labour tax. The labour tax in equilibrium is lower: 0.396 with incomplete compliance 
instead of 0.401 with full compliance. This lower tax rate provides the households with 
more income and they increase their consumption. The production sectors accordingly 
react and expand as well. Labour demand and supply increase and leisure time decreases. 
Secondly, the quota rents (or profits) are significantly lower under imperfect compliance 
since violating firms have to pay fines, which include paying for additional permits. Total 
profits in the economy with incomplete compliance are reduced to 4.9 percent of the 
profits under perfect compliance. Total fine payments in the economy equal 6.9 billion 
dollar. Finally, we notice that abatement expenditures under incomplete compliance are 
slightly higher than under full compliance. Additional abatement allows the firms to 
compensate for the higher production while still achieving the desired emission goal.  
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In the following two sections we shortly discuss how the monitoring and enforcement 
parameters and the assumption of costless monitoring influence our results. 
 
6.1 Monitoring and enforcement parameters 
As mentioned in section 4.2, data on the monitoring and enforcement parameters are very 
difficult to obtain. We assumed that, yearly, ten percent of all firms are inspected 
( 0.1 p = ) and that the variable inspection parameter η equalled 0.5. With respect to the 
penalty we assumed that violators have to pay twice the amount of evaded taxes (π = 2). 
We now look briefly at the implications of changing these parameters. 
The three parameters influence the reported fraction 
*
E θ  of emissions, the reported fraction 
*
D θ  of output and the reported fraction 
*
P θ  of permits positively (see expressions (11), (20) 
and (24)). The more stringent the monitoring and enforcement policy, the more compliant 
firms will be. 
Moreover, increasing the parameters  , and  p η π  also raises the fraction ρ  of taxes 
actually paid (see expressions (12), (21) and (25)). From the theoretical analysis we recall   30
(section 3.1.1) that the effective tax rate  E τ  under imperfect compliance is a fraction ρ  of 
the nominal tax rate  E t . Therefore, for a given nominal tax rate, we will find a higher 
effective tax rate if the monitoring and enforcement policy becomes more rigid. The gross 
efficiency costs of augmenting the nominal level of the different instruments will increase 
if  , and  p η π  increase.  
It is important to see that the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments in the 
numerical exercise will not change if we modify the monitoring and enforcement policy. 
The same utility levels will be achieved since monitoring and enforcement is costless. 
However, the environmental policy will be less strict if the monitoring and enforcement 
policy is more stringent. Nominal taxes will be lower or the number of permits issued will 
be larger. The environmental policy instruments and the monitoring and enforcement 
instruments are, to some extent, substitutes. 
 
6.2 Monitoring costs 
We now include positive monitoring costs for the government into the model. Therefore, 
we allow for a fixed budget assigned to the environmental protection agency. This reflects 
regulatory practice. However, we do not model how this budget is spent. The addition of 
these monitoring and enforcement costs reduces the utility level that can be achieved since 
government expenditures increase. Nonetheless, the relative positions of the three 
environmental policy instruments will not change. 
The relative cost efficiency of these instruments would change if one included variable 
and fixed monitoring and costs for firms as well as government. After all, not only the 
inspection agency has costs but also the firm that is inspected. For example, it has to 
accompany the auditors, prepare documents or analyse control samples. Equivalently, the 
government is not the only one to have enforcement costs. For example, firms have to pay 
for legal assistance and for gathering evidence. Moreover, third parties can be involved 
and households can be injured by the environmental offence. In chapter 3 we compare 
different policy instruments in a partial equilibrium setting while taking into account 
positive monitoring and enforcement costs.   31
Allowing for positive monitoring and enforcement costs for firms would influence the 
amount of reported emissions 
* θ . Firms will report more emissions because they want to 
decrease the expected monitoring and enforcement costs. This decision is only influenced 
by the amount of variable inspections (through parameter η) since they cannot influence 
the number of fixed inspections (parameter  p ). Moreover, firms would also abate more 
and emit less since the resulting proportion of tax actually paid 
* ρ  increases if these costs 
are included.  
When looking at the gross efficiency costs we see that those will increase when 
monitoring and enforcement costs are positive. Since firms are more compliant, the gross 
efficiency costs also increase and the effective tax rate faced by the firms is higher. 
Moreover, we would also distinguish an extra tax interaction effect because the 
government needs funds to cover monitoring and enforcement costs. These monitoring 
and enforcement costs are influenced by the number of inspections made even though we 
assume that the fixed inspection frequency  p , the variable inspection parameter η and 
the penalty parameter π  are exogenous. Allowing the government to optimise its 
monitoring and enforcement strategy would be an interesting extension. However, the 
extensive modelling of monitoring and enforcement costs and policy falls beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we examine to what extent incomplete compliance with environmental 
regulation mitigates the distortions caused by pre-existing labour taxes. In a second-best 
setting we find that policies, which do not generate revenues for the government in a 
setting of perfect compliance, perform much better under incomplete compliance. We 
include the possibility that firms are violating environmental rules and are fined with a 
certain probability. These fines provide the government with income that is used to 
alleviate existing distortions in the labour market. In our simulation, grandfathered 
tradable permits greatly improve their position vis-à-vis emission taxes and output taxes 
due to these fine payments. Clearly fines have some characteristics in common with a 
(non-linear) tax as was mentioned in Sandmo (2002).   32
In a first-best setting and given that monitoring and enforcement is costless, we find that 
the same utility levels can be reached with and without incomplete compliance. However, 
the nominal tax rate needs to be higher or the number of permits issued smaller, in order to 
obtain the required emission reduction. 
This is a first attempt to integrate monitoring and enforcement considerations into the 
choice of policy instruments in a second-best setting. Obviously it would be interesting to 
include quantity instruments into the framework. This would require us to think about how 
to make non-compliance comparable across instruments and would involve using some 
other assumptions for the expected fine function. This would pose new challenges for the 
numerical model.  
Also broader monitoring and enforcement policy options need to be considered. Fines can 
be replaced by firm closure, imprisonment or other non-monetary sanctions.  
Furthermore, it would be useful to take into account the possibility of measurement errors. 
In reality the measurement equipment of the inspection agency is not perfectly accurate. 
False positives and false negatives are encountered. Some violators remain undetected 
even if they are inspected, while some innocent firms will be sentenced.  
Another possible extension is to distinguish between the probability of detection and the 
probability of punishment. In practice we often see that minor violations are left 
unpunished. This is because convicting a firm is not costless. So it is possible that judges 
decide to drop the case because it is not worth the time and money to follow up. 
Therefore, the firms will make their decisions based on the probability of punishment and 
not the probability of detection. 
Further extensions can consist of changing the assumptions of the economic model. We 
could work with heterogeneous firms per sector. Or we could incorporate heterogeneous 
consumers and take distributional aspects into account. Finally, we could introduce 
imperfect compliance for the labour tax too. This is not unrealistic as the shadow economy 
counts for 10 to 25% of GDP in Western economies (Sandmo, 1981). 
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Appendix A: Firm behaviour 
For pdet = 0 or f = 0, we get a corner solution and the reported emissions will equal zero. 
Since violators are not punished for lying about their emissions, they maximise their 
profits by reporting no emissions and therefore paying no taxes. 
We investigate the influence of the emission tax  E t  and the penalty π on the optimal 
behaviour of firms. More specifically we look at changes in actual emissions e* (= eo - a*) 
and in the fraction of emissions reported 
*
E θ . These results are summarised in table 1 for 
different scenarios. We distinguish four scenarios depending on the value of the emission 
tax rate  E t  and the penalty π. Each scenario is now discussed in turn. 
 
E t   π    *
E θ   e* 
> 0  > 1 
 
*
























= 0  ≥ 1    *
E θ  = 0  e* = eo 
> 0  = 1 
 
*





















> 0  → ∞    *
E θ  → 1  c'(eo-e*) →  E t  
Table 2: Reaction of firms to changes in the emission tax and the penalty 
 
Scenario 1:  01 E and t π >>  
This scenario is discussed more fully in the body of the text.  


















Next, in a second step, the firm chooses the actual emissions e to minimise its 
environmental costs. This gives us the following expression: 
  ( )
** ' oE E ce e t τ ρ −==  
 
Scenario 2:  01 E and t π =≥  
Firms will not invest in abatement nor will they report any emissions. Therefore, we focus 
on a strictly positive emission tax from now on.  
 
Scenario 3:  01 E and t π >=  
When the penalty equals its lower bound or π = 1 and  0a n d 0 p η ≠ ≠ , violating firms still 
have to pay their overdue taxes. The reported emissions will not be zero because the 
reported emissions influence the probability of detection. The total amount paid, taxes on 










actual emissions (see table 1). This result is obtained by minimising  det EE te p f θ + with 
respect to θE. Next, the firm chooses the actual emissions e to minimise its environmental 










=−  since the penalty π equals 1. 
 
Scenario 4:  0 E and t π >→ ∞  
When the penalty π goes to infinity, the firms will be reporting more and more truthfully. 
The marginal abatement cost will, in the limit, equal the emission tax rate. 
A summary of these findings can be found in table 1.   35
Appendix B:  Deriving expression (16) 
First we derive an expression for the change in labour tax necessary to maintain 
government budget balance following the increase in emission tax.  
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Using the expression of the (partial equilibrium) efficiency cost, we obtain: 
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 +  ∂  =− + +   ∂   
 (36) 
We are interested in the gross effect of the tax increase  E t  on welfare. Differentiating 
utility ( ,1 , ) ( ) DL Vv p t G E π φ =− + −  with respect to  E t  and ignoring the terms in φ gives 
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ρ =− and with λ equal to the marginal utility of income, 
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This is the efficiency cost (ignoring environmental benefits) for an incremental increase in 
E t , expressed in monetary terms.   36
Appendix C: The numerical model 
The numerical model was written in GAMS.  
This is the description of the model when an emission tax is levied. 
 
1.  Sets 
i = {D, N, L}   - inputs 
j = {D, N, CD, CN}  - outputs 
k = {leis, C, CD, CN} 
 
2.  Parameters 
e α    effectiveness of abatement technology  /0.155/ 
ij α    distribution parameter for input i in production of good j (via calibration) 
k α    distribution parameter for the utility function (via calibration) 
i β    pollution content of good i used    /D  0.062768, N  0, L  0/ 
χ     curvature parameter for abatement    /0.5/ 
δ, µ scaling  parameters 
Etot           maximum amount of emissions possible (in millions of kg)  /23000.028/ 
reduc  emission reduction  
j σ    elasticity of substitution in production of good j  
/D  0.8, N  0.8, CD  0.9, CN  0.9/ 
c σ    elasticity of substitution between consumption goods  /0.85/ 
u σ    elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure   /0.96/ 
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3.  Variables 
j A    abatement expenditure in industry j 
ADi  aggregate demand for good i 
ij b    use of input i per unit of output of good j 
CN CD b b ,   relative share of consumption of CD and CN to total consumption 
C     aggregate demand for composite consumption good 
CDdem  aggregate demand for energy-intensive goods 
CNdem  aggregate demand for non-energy intensive final goods 
j E    actual pollution emitted from production of good j 
Etot  total actual emissions 
η    variable inspection parameter 
Fj    fine per sector j  
G   lump-sum  transfer 
L    aggregate labour supply 
leis   leisure or non-market time 
p     fixed probability of detection 
j pdet   probability of detection per sector j 
C p    price of composite good 
j p    price of output j 
L pr   price of labour 
i pr    price of input i 
π    fine paid on overdue taxes 
∏j    profit per industry j 
∏tot  total profits or total pollution quota rents 
REV government  revenue 
E t    emission  tax 
j t     tax on output j 
L t    labour  taxation  rate 
R t    rent  taxation  rate   38
Ej j E θ   reported emissions from production of good j 
Xj j X θ   reported output of good j 
U    total consumer utility 
j X   aggregate supply of good j 
ij X   use of good i in production of good j 
 
4.  Equations 
4.1 Production – firm behaviour 
Output:  


















α δ  
Profit:     det () . jj j X j j i i j E E j j j j j
i
p tX p r X t E A p F θθ Π= − − − − − ∑  
Total profits:    tot j
j
Π= Π ∑  
 Expected  fine:    ( ) () det ..
jj j
jj j j jE
j
EE









Emissions:   1
j









  =−       
 
Total emissions:  ∑ =
j















First-order condition ( j A ):  ()
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Budget constraint:   (1 ) (1 ) CD CN L L tot R C p CD p CN pr t L t p G + =− + Π − +  
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Labour:   leis T L − =    40
 Numeraire:  1 = L pr  
 
4.3 Government behaviour 
Revenue:  det . LEE j j j X j j R t o t j j
jj j
REV t L t E t X t p F θθ =+ + + Π + ∑ ∑∑  
Tax:   RL tt =  
 
4.4 Aggregate demand and supply 
Inputs:   ∑ =
j
ij i X AD  
Outputs:  CD X CD =  
CN X CN =   
{ } N D i for AD X i i , = =  
 
4.5 Equilibrium conditions 
Labour market:  ∑ + =
j
j L A AD L  
Emissions:   (1 ) Etot reduc Etot =−  
Government:   G p REV C =  
 
Bibliography 
Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 76, nr. 2, p. 169-217. 
Bovenberg, A.L. and de Mooij, R.A. (1994). Environmental levies and distortionary taxation.   41
American Economic Review, vol. 84, p. 1085-1089. 
Cohen, M.A. (2000). Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy. In Tietenberg and 
Folmer (eds), International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume III, 
Edward Elgar Publishers. 
Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the ‘double dividend’: a reader’s guide. 
International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 2, p. 157-183.  
Goulder, L., Parry, I., and Burtraw, D. (1997). Revenue-raising vs. other approaches to 
environmental protection: the critical significance of pre-existing tax distortions. RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 28, nr. 4, p. 708-731. 
Goulder, L. H., Parry, I.W.H., Williams III, R.C., and Burtraw, D., (1999). The cost-
effectiveness of alternative instruments for environmental protection in a second-best setting, 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 72, p. 329-360. 
Harrington, W. (1988). Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 37, p. 29-53. 
Heyes, A. (2001). The law and economics of the environment. Edward Elgar. p.424 
Keller, W.J. (1976). A nested CES-type utility function and its demand and price-index functions. 
European Economic Review, vol. 7, p. 175-186. 
King, M.A. (1983). Welfare analysis of tax reforms using household data. Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 21, p. 183-214. 
Lear, K.K. (1998). An empirical estimation of EPA administrative penalties. Working paper, 
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. 
Magat, W. and Viscusi, W.K. (1990). Effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory enforcement: the case 
of industrial effluent standards. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 33, p. 331-360. 
Mayeres, I. and Proost, S., (1997). Optimal tax and public investment rules for congestion type of 
externalities, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 99, nr. 2, p. 261-279. 
Polinsky, A.M. and Shavell, S. (2000). The economic theory of public law enforcement. Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol. XXXVIII (March), p. 45-76 
Pechan, E.H. and associates, (1996). Emission Reduction and Cost Analysis Model for NOX 
(ERCAM-NOx). http://www.pechan.com/projects/Reports_Publications/ 
Russell, C.S., Harrington, W. and Vaughan, W.J. (1986). Enforcing pollution control laws. 
Resources for the Future.   42
Sandmo, A. (1981). Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity-efficiency tradeoff. Journal 
of Public Economics, vol. 16, p. 265-288. 
Sandmo, A. (2002). Efficient environmental policy with imperfect compliance. Environmental 
and Resource Economics, vol. 23(1), p. 85-103. 
Schmutzler, A. and Goulder, L.H. (1997). The choice between emission taxes and output taxes 
under imperfect monitoring. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 32, p. 
51-64. 
    






The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division 
of the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. The CES research department employs some 100 
people. The division Energy, Transport & Environment (ETE) 
currently consists of about 15 full time researchers. The general 
aim of ETE is to apply state of the art economic theory to 
current policy issues at the Flemish, Belgian and European 
level. An important asset of ETE is its extensive portfolio of 
numerical partial and general equilibrium models for the 
assessment of transport, energy and environmental policies. 
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2004 
 
N°2004-15  Rousseau S., Proost S. (2004), The Relative Efficiency of Market-
based Environmental Policy Instruments with Imperfect 
Compliance 
N°2004-14  Eyckmans J., Finus M. (2004), An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for 
Coalition Games with Externalities 
N°2004-13  De Borger B., Mayeres I. (2004), Taxation of car ownership, car use 
and public transport: insights derived from a discrete choice 
numerical optimisation model  
N°2004-12  De Borger B., Proost S. (2004), Vertical and horizontal tax 
competition in the transport sector 
N°2004-11  de Palma A., Dunkerley F., Proost S. (2004), Imperfect Competition 
and Congestion in a City with asymmetric subcenters  
N°2004-10  Calthrop E., Proost S. (2004), Regulating on-street parking 
N°2004-09  de Palma A., Proost S. (2004) Imperfect competition and congestion 
in the City  
N°2004-08  Pepermans G., Willems B. (2004), Ramsey Pricing in a Congested 
Network with Market Power in Generation: A Numerical 
Illustration for Belgium 
N°2004-07  Delhaye E. (2004), Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km 
tax 
N°2004-06  Eyckmans J., Finus M. (2004), An Empirical Assessment of Measures 
to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties 
n°2004-05  Eyckmans J., Meynaerts E., Ochelen S. (2004), The Environmental 
Costing Model: a tool for more efficient environmental 
policymaking in Flanders 
 
n°2004-04  Saveyn B., Proost S. (2004), Environmental Tax Reform with Vertical 
Tax Externalities in a Federal State 
 
n°2004-03  Rousseau S. (2004), Timing of environmental inspections: Survival of 
the compliant 